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Abstract 
 
This article introduces and applies a three-stage process to show how advocates of the 
conflicting institutional logics of budgetary stewardship and performance improvement in 
English and Welsh local authorities created a hybrid logic. Drawing on interviews with 
officers in 25 councils, it demonstrates how cooperative working environments meant that 
hybridization proceeded largely 'peacefully', in contrast to previous studies of more 
competitive contexts that found it occurs on a 'battlefield'. We argue that the nature of 
conflict within the hybridization process, along with the power dynamics between 
representatives of different logics, shapes the nature and sustainability of the resulting hybrid. 
  
Introduction 
 
Scholars studying mergers, partnerships or the introduction of new management techniques 
have often argued that organizations develop ‘hybrids’ of previously-conflicting ‘institutional 
logics’, which subsequently influence decision-making and organizational behaviour (Miller 
and Kurunmaki, 2011). In the public sector, these hybrids are often the consequence of 
macro-level institutional pressures emanating from neo-liberalism and New Public 
Management, which emphasize private sector managerial ideas and thereby challenge 
traditional notions of public service at the meso (or ‘field’) level of relations between central 
government and local public bodies. The hybrid, which operates at the organizational level, 
incorporates elements from both conflicting logics (Mullins, 2006; Pillay et al., 2016).  
 
Hybrids invariably involve compromise; this article examines how the advocates of 
conflicting logics agree to accommodate each other’s perspectives. In line with DiMaggio 
(1983), the literature tends to assume that this is an inherently competitive process. Scholars 
have even adopted military metaphors to evoke the idea of ‘institutional warfare’ (Hoffmann, 
1999), in which they struggle for supremacy on a ‘battlefield’ (Seo and Creed, 2002; Reay 
and Hinings, 2005). Yet, although many studies have focused on public bodies, they have not 
examined whether this ‘battlefield’ characterization applies in such organizations, where 
decision-making cultures are often more cooperative than in the private sector (Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1974; Agranoff 2006; Argento et al. 2010; Ahrens and Ferry, 2016). Instead, they 
tend to concentrate on how organizations try to manage the internal conflicts inherent in such 
a hybrid arrangement after it has become established (Grossi et al., 2017), or the way in 
which individual actors exploit tensions to effect change (Dahan, 2015).  
 
Indeed, as Skelcher and Smith (2015: 434) highlight, ‘the public administration and nonprofit 
literature… still lacks a clear theoretical foundation that can explain what it is that creates a 
hybrid, whether different forms of hybrid emerge in different situations, and if so what 
consequences arise’. With this in mind, we asked ourselves the questions: are advocates of 
different logics always competing with each other, even in contexts where cooperation is 
commonplace, and how do these interactions shape the resulting hybrid? Based on our 
fieldwork findings, we then hoped to generate further hypotheses (Lijphardt, 1971) associated 
with how working cultures might shape the process of hybridization, and ultimately influence 
the nature of hybrid logics.  
 
To address this puzzle, we examined the process of hybridization in English and Welsh local 
authorities. Since the 1970s, councils in both countries have been characterised by an 
institutional logic of budgetary stewardship, and therefore rely heavily on management tools 
that monitor revenues, expenditure and other financial indicators (Coombs and Edwards, 
1995; Ferry et al., 2017). From 1997 onwards, however, the UK and Welsh Governments 
sought to introduce a logic of performance improvement into local authorities, along with its 
associated toolbox of targets, indicators, performance reporting, benchmarking and ‘league 
tables’. Notably, a recent study of public services in large US cities found that cost 
accounting was negatively correlated with a focus on performance, and therefore shows how 
these logics conflict with (rather than complement) each other (Mohr, 2016). As such, the 
stage appeared set for a ‘battle’ between the advocates of budgetary stewardship and 
performance improvement in English and Welsh local authorities. 
 
Yet, although elected councillors in the UK are often highly partisan (Leach and Copus, 
2004), appointed officers have no political affiliation – and local authorities have a long 
history of cooperation and accommodating conflicting perspectives (Thurmaier and Wood, 
2002; Ahrens et al., 2018). With this in mind, we sought to investigate whether the 
interactions between officers who advocated these conflicting logics was more ‘peaceful’ 
than the metaphors of ‘institutional warfare’ and ‘battlefields’ might suggest. By extension, 
we felt this might help to develop a more nuanced theoretical perspective on the process of 
hybridization in organizations that have a strong culture of cooperation rather than 
competition. Furthermore, because previous studies have shown that power dynamics 
between key actors shape the nature of institutional logics (Dodds, 2011), and the UK and 
Welsh Governments adopted very different approaches to try and introduce performance 
improvement into local authorities, we selected England and Wales to identify how the nature 
of these interactions shape the resulting hybrid.  
 
The article makes two key contributions. First, it introduces a three-stage model, comprising 
recognition, negotiation and operationalization, which can help us to analyse the process of 
hybridization more generally and thereby contribute towards understanding why hybrids 
might consist of a particular blend of incumbent and challenging logics. Second, it draws on 
the empirical findings to set out a series of hypotheses around how organizational cultures 
may influence both the process of hybridization and ultimately the nature of the resulting 
hybrid logic. These hypotheses open up the agenda to further research into hybridization, 
particularly comparative studies that examine organizations with contrasting working 
cultures.  
 
The next section highlights how the public sector performance management and neo-
institutionalism literatures have not focused sufficiently on how interactions between the 
representatives of conflicting logics influence the development of hybrids. It then outlines 
how the UK and Welsh Governments adopted different strategies to try and impose a logic of 
performance improvement on local authorities in England and Wales respectively. Following 
a section on methods, we then set out our fieldwork findings using our three-stage process 
model of hybridization, and draw on these findings to form our hypotheses in the discussion. 
Finally, the arguments are summed up in a conclusion. 
 
Institutional Logics and Public Sector Performance Management 
 
In recent decades, governments in various developed countries have sought to introduce 
performance management frameworks in order to try and ensure that their policy objectives 
are delivered at the local level (van Dooren et al. 2015; Osborne, 2017). In particular, 
successive UK Governments introduced a range of centralized frameworks that set out how 
English local government should operate and what it should focus on (Ferry et al., 2015). 
Some quantitative and evaluative studies argued that these performance frameworks had a 
positive effect on local government performance (Boyne and Chen, 2006; Boyne, 2010). 
However, they have not focused on the process through which local authorities incorporated 
the central government priority of performance improvement into their everyday working 
practices, and – by extension – what this might tell us more broadly about how and why 
organizations might change.  
 
Neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) has been 
employed widely to explain stability and the potential for change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006), and it can therefore provide a theoretical basis to undertake this analysis. Its focus on 
how ‘institutional logics’ (defined as the ‘organizing principles’ or ‘beliefs and practices’ that 
guide the behaviour of actors in the field (Friedland and Alford, 1991)) shape decision-
making and activity is particularly useful. These organizing principles consist of material 
practices and symbolic constructions (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248), and they provide 
meaning to individuals’ social reality (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) by constituting formal and 
informal ‘rules of action’ (Thornton, 2004). Logics exist at various levels, and a change at the 
‘organizational’ level (which for the purposes of our study means each individual local 
authority) could therefore potentially have impacts and implications at the ‘field’ level (in our 
case the level of central-local relations), and even at the institution level of neoliberalism and 
NPM. This could also work in a ‘downwards’ direction, in that changes at the institution level 
can affect the field and individual organizations.  
 
In most jurisdictions, one logic will dominate over other logics, and result in the organization 
behaving in a way that is congruent with this dominant perspective (Thornton et al., 2005). 
However, new and conflicting logics sometimes emerge to challenge this dominance, and 
their advocates may compete with those individuals that represent the incumbent logic. 
Various studies have argued that this struggle takes places on a ‘battlefield’, and that the logic 
associated with the most powerful or influential actors in the organization emerges victorious 
(DiMaggio, 1983; Reay and Hinings, 2005; Seo and Creed, 2002). This tends to be the 
dominant incumbent logic, unless there is a significant change at the field level. 
Alternatively, the dominant logic may incorporate some aspects of a subordinate logic into a 
‘hybrid’ arrangement, in order to neutralize the competitive threat to existing institutionalized 
practices (Reay and Hinings, 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2006; Miller and Kurunmaki, 2011). In such cases, advocates of the different 
logics that constitute the resulting hybrid exercise (often varying degrees of) influence over 
organizational behaviour and decision-making. 
 
Previous studies have examined a range of different organizations, including professional 
bodies (Muzio et al., 2013), profit-oriented businesses (Thornton, 2004), health or social care 
agencies (Reay and Hinings, 2005; Fenger et al., 2014), housing associations (Mullins, 2006) 
and orchestras (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005). Most argue that the struggle between 
representatives of conflicting logics is inherently competitive – regardless of whether it 
results in a change in the dominant logic, the development of a hybrid arrangement, or the 
continuation of the status quo. According to this perspective, competing actors want to ‘win’ 
this struggle, rather than cooperate and agree a compromise solution with their challengers. 
Yet none of them break down the process of hybridization into stages to analyse how the 
actors advocating each different logic interacted, and how contextual factors (such as a 
prevailing culture of cooperation or competition) may influence the way in which a hybrid 
emerges. This is despite the fact that studies of innovation, policy diffusion and policy 
learning have stressed the importance of these issues for some time (Rogers, 2003; Simmons 
et al., 2006; Gilardi, 2016; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013), and we can draw clear parallels 
between them and the hybridization of institutional logics. 
 
This article introduces a three-stage model to analyse the process of hybridization, which 
comprises the recognition that a new and potentially conflicting logic is likely to be 
influential; the negotiation that leads to representatives of conflicting logics resolving their 
differences; and, the operationalization of the resulting hybrid. Whilst we recognise that this 
process is unlikely to be linear, these stages nonetheless provide a useful heuristic to help 
explain how hybrids may emerge. It uses the comparison of English and Welsh local 
government to illustrate how the negotiation phase may proceed differently in organisations 
that have a more cooperative (rather than competitive) culture, and thereby questions the 
assumption that the advocates of conflicting logics always interact with each other on a 
‘battlefield’. It also draws on our empirical study to highlight the importance of power 
dynamics in shaping the resulting hybrid.  
 
Research context and methods 
 
The logic of budgetary stewardship 
 
For many centuries the institutional logic of budgetary stewardship has been influential 
within English and Welsh local government at the institutional, field and organizational 
levels, gradually strengthening over time and becoming the incumbent logic (Coombs and 
Edwards, 1995). This trend was accelerated by the 1972 Local Government Act, which 
required every local authority to nominate an individual as being responsible for the council’s 
budget (National Archives 1972, s. 151) so that a single officer could be held ultimately 
accountable for financial management. These managers, who are normally finance directors, 
have subsequently assumed the job title Section 151 Officer after the Act’s paragraph that 
established their role. Notably, their influence within local authorities has increased 
significantly since the 1970s, as central government has reduced the funding it provides to 
councils, restricted their opportunities for raising revenue, and required them by statute to 
deliver a balanced budget every year (McEldowney, 2003; Ferry et al., 2017).   
 
Central government funding for English local authorities has fallen by 49 per cent since 2010 
(National Audit Office, 2018), and Welsh councils have also experienced major funding cuts 
more recently (Jones et al., 2015). Moreover, demographic changes mean that local 
authorities in both countries face a significant rise in demand for services such as adult social 
care in the coming years, yet they will have fewer resources to meet this demand (Hastings et 
al., 2015). These factors have led to councils increasing their focus on financial reporting and 
levels of revenue and expenditure. In particular, they sought to reduce input costs in order to 
prevent overspending, which has entrenched and strengthened the institutional logic of 
budgetary stewardship (Ferry et al., 2017).  
 
Evolution of local government performance frameworks in England 
 
From the early 1980s onwards, and particularly during New Labour’s period in office 
between 1997 and 2010, successive UK Governments introduced a range of centralized 
performance frameworks for English councils. These were based on a new institutional logic 
of performance improvement, which was inculcated through ministerial targets, a statutory 
duty ‘to secure continuous improvement in the way in which [their] functions are exercised’ 
(National Archives 1999), key performance indicators, benchmarking, ‘red, amber green’ 
performance reporting mechanisms and ‘league tables’ that compared different local 
authorities. This logic conflicted with the incumbent preference for budgetary stewardship, 
because it encouraged councils to innovate and/or adopt ‘good practices’ that had been 
identified in other authorities, rather than exercise prudence and reduce exposure to risks. As 
a result, councils faced internal dilemmas about whether they should try to reduce input costs 
(in line with budgetary stewardship) or direct more resources towards public services (in line 
with performance improvement).  
 
The new logic of performance improvement was encapsulated in various frameworks and 
indicators that monitored, scored and ranked how local authorities were delivering central 
government priorities (Ferry et al., 2015). In particular, Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA) produced annual star ratings for each council, based on how it was 
meeting central performance targets, the quality of its financial management and its capacity 
to deliver improvements. Ministers introduced a range of incentives to encourage councils to 
improve their scores, including publishing reports online, promising to remove restrictions on 
planning, spending and decision-making for those authorities that earned high ratings, and 
also granting them new powers to trade and charge for services. Simultaneously, the threat of 
direct intervention by central government hung over those local authorities that were judged 
to be performing poorly (Jas and Skelcher, 2014). Notably, many local authorities disputed 
audit ratings that they perceived to be unduly harsh (Game, 2006), illustrating how highly 
they valued their scores. Furthermore, Welsh authorities were not subject to CPA, and they 
increased property taxes by less than their English counterparts during this period (Lockwood 
and Porcelli 2013) – suggesting that the centralized framework meant English councils were 
keener than their Welsh counterparts to raise extra resources to try and improve frontline 
services.  
 
After the 2010 election, the incoming Coalition Government (comprising Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats) abolished the centralized frameworks and allowed English councils to 
develop their own approaches to performance improvement instead. Since ministers had now 
removed the mechanisms that encouraged this logic, and because this change coincided with 
a period of deep cuts in central government grants to local authorities, we might expect 
budgetary stewardship to reclaim its position of dominance. Conversely, if a new hybrid 
arrangement incorporating both logics had become institutionalized, performance 
improvement may continue to influence decision-making and organizational behaviour. 
 
  
Evolution of local government performance frameworks in Wales 
 
Welsh local authorities came under the jurisdiction of the UK government until devolution 
came into effect in 1999. As a result, the legacy of the 1972 Local Government Act, 
including the position of the Section 151 Officer and the dominance of budgetary stewardship 
as an institutional logic, still applies in Wales.  
 
Notably, however, the various performance frameworks for public bodies in Wales evolved 
in a different direction to England since the turn of the millennium. In particular, instead of 
encouraging competition between public bodies, the Welsh Government was much keener to 
promote collaboration and shared learning to try and address capacity concerns and 
ultimately improve performance (Iorweth, 2013). As a result, it did not use indicators to 
highlight differences between local authorities – and therefore detailed reporting frameworks 
or published ‘star ratings’ could not exist (Martin et al., 2013). This meant that there were far 
fewer incentives for authorities to compete with one another than in England: the Welsh 
Government did not ‘reward’ those local authorities that were perceived to be high-
performing, or threaten to intervene directly in struggling councils.  
 
Since 2011, the Welsh Government has taken a more direct interest in local authority 
improvement and introduced a number of Local Government Measures to increase its control 
over councils. As a result, ministers can now force them to merge if they feel that ‘effective 
local government is not likely to be achieved’ in a particular area (National Archives, 2011), 
councils are required to publish some performance information online, and the Wales Audit 
Office publishes annual analyses of whether a local authority has delivered its planned 
improvements (Iorweth, 2013). In addition, the Welsh Local Government Association has 
assumed responsibility for performance measurement activities, including a national system 
of benchmarking (McAteer and Stephens, 2013). In other words, Wales has shifted away 
from the consensual, collaborative approach and towards more hierarchical and competitive 
mechanisms, along the lines of the various frameworks that used to apply in England (Martin 
et al., 2013). By raising the profile of this logic, ministers may be increasing the likelihood 
that it can exercise influence within a hybrid arrangement. 
 
Research Methods 
 
 Building on a previous project that involved surveying 70 local authorities in England and 
Wales on how they were addressing strategic challenges (Ferry et al., 2017), we conducted 
telephone interviews with finance managers from twenty-five of the councils that responded 
to the survey: seventeen in England and eight in Wales. The survey had highlighted the 
potential conflict between budgetary stewardship and performance improvement logics, 
particularly in the context of austerity funding cuts, and our interviews focused specifically 
on how the authorities were managing this issue. 
 
In order to gather perspectives from different types of council, we selected interviewees from 
a cross-section of authority types and geographical locations in both England and Wales. 
Since we were particularly interested in how finance managers were responding to the 
emergence of a performance improvement logic, and also wanted to obtain data from the 
same professional viewpoint within the different councils, we only interviewed officers from 
this group. This helped us to gain an understanding of how institutional logics operated 
within local government in each country. The interviews focused particularly on how 
managers had sought to manage the tension between long-standing traditions of budgetary 
stewardship and central government’s more recent drive for performance improvement, and 
incorporated any resulting hybrid logic into their organizational practices. We conducted 
them between 2010 and 2012, after the UK Government had begun to dismantle its 
centralised performance management systems and announced initial funding cuts for English 
local authorities, and after the Welsh Government had adopted its more hierarchical approach 
to performance improvement. We asked interviewees about both historical and contemporary 
events.  
 
Inductively, we developed a three-stage model of hybridization based on the interview data, 
comprising the recognition that a new institutional logic is becoming influential, the 
negotiation between representatives of conflicting logics that shapes the hybrid arrangement, 
and the operationalization of the resulting approach. With this in mind, we extracted sections 
from the interview transcripts and coded them according to the logic and the stage of the 
hybridization process to which they related. We then cross-referenced these quotes with other 
studies of English and Welsh local government since 2010, and with the academic literature 
on institutional logics. 
 
We also discussed our findings and other emerging issues with representatives of the 
Societies of County and District Treasurers, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, the UK’s Department for Communities and Local Government, and the Welsh 
Local Government Association, and corroborated our data by consulting official 
documentation from central government, local government, and professional and media 
sources. This helped us to put the issues raised by survey and interview respondents into the 
context of the changes taking place within English and Welsh local government during that 
period.  
 Research findings  
 
Our interviews confirmed that controlling input costs had been a strategic priority for many 
years, because of local government’s statutory duty to deliver balanced revenue budgets and 
the importance of the Section 151 Officer. However, issues of performance improvement 
were also important to our survey participants. The next three subsections focus on each stage 
of hybridization separately, drawing on the interview data to highlight how the contrasting 
approaches of the UK and Welsh Governments meant that the process differed in each 
country. 
 
The recognition stage of hybridization 
 
During the recognition phase of hybridization, an organization acknowledges that a new 
institutional logic is becoming increasingly influential and seeks to understand the nature of 
any conflict with the incumbent logic. With this in mind, our English interviewees explained 
how the central government drive for performance improvement had particular implications 
for how the council allocated its resources and the dominant logic of budgetary stewardship: 
 
CPA effectively ranked local authorities in league tables. Senior officers and politicians don’t 
want to be at the bottom of those tables. So it is suddenly no longer acceptable for a Finance 
Director just to say ‘no you can’t spend that’ on the proviso of living within budget. 
Performance across a multitude of variables has to be accommodated (Finance Director, 
County Council in the Midlands). 
 
As mentioned earlier, Welsh authorities were not subjected to centralized monitoring 
frameworks such as CPA after devolution in 1999. Instead, the Welsh Government tried to 
encourage collaboration (both amongst councils and also between central bodies and local 
government) to address capacity concerns and improve performance. At this stage, however, 
our interviewees associated the idea of performance improvement with efficiency rather than 
effectiveness. This meant that they did not focus as much on service outcomes, or take a more 
holistic approach to understanding how the council operates and what it intends to achieve: 
 
There has been an emphasis on collaboration with more than a hint that efficiency is 
important – less senior officers, less core systems etc.  I think there has been less focus on 
outcomes – how Welsh services really improve the quality of life (Finance Director, Unitary 
Authority in the East of Wales).  
 
Furthermore, as this suggests, Welsh authorities interpreted ‘efficiency’ in terms of reducing 
resource inputs rather than improving productivity or outputs. Crucially, this meant that it did 
not conflict with the principle of budgetary stewardship, but rather reinforced it. At this point, 
therefore, the central government drive for performance improvement had not even got to the 
recognition stage amongst Welsh local authority practitioners, since they did not see it as any 
different from the institutional logic that was already dominant in their organizations. 
Although councils benchmarked with each other, this was primarily to try and identify ways 
of reducing costs and was therefore consistent with budgetary stewardship. However, after 
the Welsh Government adopted a more hierarchical approach to encouraging local authority 
improvement, authorities did begin to take more notice of the performance improvement 
logic and consider ways of incorporating it into decision-making processes: 
 
The regulatory regime has changed in Wales… and increasingly effectiveness is becoming a 
higher priority (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the South of Wales).  
 
As this suggests, the Local Government Measures led to performance improvement reaching 
the recognition stage within Welsh authorities. In other words, the degree of field-level 
pressure for a change in the dominant logic was instrumental in shaping whether this was 
even discussed within local authorities at an organizational level. As we shall see, it also 
influenced power dynamics within the negotiation phase, and the ultimate nature of the 
hybrid logic that local authorities operationalized in both countries.  
 
The negotiation stage 
 
During the negotiation stage, advocates of each logic interact with each other to resolve their 
differences and design the resulting hybrid. In nearly all of the authorities we interviewed, 
and in both countries, the performance improvement logic was taken up by officers 
associated with the Chief Executive’s department who were responsible for policy and/or 
performance. The stage appeared to be set for some kind of ‘battle’ between these individuals 
and their colleagues in the finance team, who represented the logic of budgetary stewardship. 
Interestingly, our interviewees recognized that these two departments might compete for 
attention: 
 
The performance management team were based in the CEO’s department. There was initially 
mistrust between finance and them (Finance Director, Council in the West Midlands). 
 
To address any potential problems, senior managers within each authority in England 
arranged meetings between service departments, as well as central support functions such as 
finance and performance management. Crucially, there was widespread recognition of the 
need to agree common strategies: 
 
Overall there was an understanding that it was a political process and performance had to be 
justified not just for your own department but how this affected the local authority overall. 
Compromise was therefore inherent in the negotiations (Finance Director, Council in 
Yorkshire). 
 
Moreover, our interviewees stressed that this political pressure for performance improvement 
changed the nature of these meetings. Rather than being focused on financial management, 
the authority’s performance against central targets was now an important consideration – 
illustrating the extent to which a hybrid institutional logic was developing: 
 
Meetings were traditionally to decide on allocating the budget, but there was now much more 
focus on what performance would be delivered and how this would affect KPIs and how these 
actually materialized in the external assessment (Finance Director, Council in Inner London). 
 
Indeed, several English interviewees mentioned that their authorities developed sophisticated 
internal systems to ensure that performance improvement and assessment considerations 
informed resource allocation decisions. These included assessing whether a service was a 
strategic priority and calculating how much money might be required to improve its score 
against a key performance indicator (Finance Director, County Council in the Midlands). 
Another interviewee, who also mentioned that their authority had adopted a similar process 
for resource allocation, highlighted how this had implications for local policy-making: 
 
This may mean more resources had to be allocated to an area, and taken from another area. 
However it was not just taking budget, but could mean a very visible change in performance. 
As a result, this had to be discussed and agreed with not only officers but also the local 
politicians who were the respective portfolio holders (Finance Director, Council in Outer 
London). 
 
As these quotes illustrate, although changes to resource allocations did result in some service 
areas ‘winning’ and others ‘losing’, these decisions were made in a consensual manner. Our 
interviewees recognized that they had to take account of the UK Government’s performance 
frameworks in their corporate strategies, and were willing to compromise in order to 
incorporate the logic of performance improvement into decision-making. In the words of 
another officer: 
 
There has to be some give and take for the greater good of the council. I am not saying I will 
just agree to hand over budget to another directorate, far from it, but ultimately if the 
arguments are there, then it becomes necessary to sometimes accept it (Finance Director, 
Council in North East England). 
 
The negotiation phase began later in Wales, due to its much lengthier recognition stage. 
However, aware of the potential sanctions that the Welsh Government could employ if 
councils did not respond to the agenda, advocates of budgetary stewardship did begin to 
engage with the logic of performance improvement at this point. Although financial concerns 
were still prominent – and particularly after funding cuts began to bite – this meant that 
authorities were beginning to consider overall effectiveness alongside service efficiency: 
 
Efficiency does not come from doing the same thing for less cost but in challenging whether 
the thing we are doing actually delivers what the citizen actually needs and thus the 
performance (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the West of Wales). 
 
As this suggests, advocates of performance improvement had begun to influence decision-
making within Welsh authorities, alongside those who represented budgetary stewardship. 
Service managers engaged in discussions with finance about how the budget might affect 
performance and vice-versa. Moreover, as with the English local authorities, the process of 
hybridizing budgetary stewardship and performance improvement was relatively peaceful: 
 
The finance function is powerful in Welsh local authorities, but they still embrace 
performance improvement alongside the budget. (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the 
North of Wales). 
 
Notably, however, the process of negotiation was more one-sided in Wales than in England, 
with the incumbent logic of budgetary stewardship (represented by the finance team) having 
more influence than central government drives for performance improvement and 
effectiveness (and their respective champions in operations management and policy). This 
was largely due to the fact that the Welsh Government did not follow the UK’s lead and 
create an elaborate system of inspections and incentives to encourage authorities to embrace 
performance improvement.  
 
The operationalization stage 
 
These hybrid logics survived during the operationalization stage, when the councils 
incorporated the new blend of priorities into everyday practices. Some of our English 
interviewees did stress that ‘ultimately the fall back is the budget’ (Finance Director, Council 
in East London), which suggests that a focus on controlling input costs is still more important 
than performance considerations. Nonetheless, there was widespread agreement that the latter 
were deeply embedded in organizational activity alongside financial management: 
 
Performance management has not replaced the budget, but is something that is employed 
with the budget in allocating resources, monitoring activities and reporting. It is therefore 
ingrained (Finance Director, Council in East London). 
 
Indeed, several officers in England stressed that the new hybrid had become so 
institutionalized that local authorities still gave performance due consideration alongside the 
budget, even after the UK Government abolished its centralized assessment frameworks in 
2010. In the words of one manager: 
 
Even after the scrapping of external assessment, performance now remains embedded in local 
authority culture (Finance Director, County Council in the West Midlands). 
 
For their part, Welsh authorities operationalized the hybrid logic through a greater emphasis 
on benchmarking (Finance Director, Welsh Local Government Association) – an exercise 
that has its roots in financial management. This also reduced the possibility of any ‘battle’ 
between performance and finance officers, because both sides viewed benchmarking as a 
useful endeavour to gather information about potential cost savings or operational 
improvements. Gradually, councils developed more indicators that focused on outputs or 
outcomes, reflecting the growing influence of performance improvement: 
 
Initially the focus of the performance information was efficiency-based. Finance remained 
dominant over discourses as part of controlling the budget. However, service departments 
obviously did feed in to the efficiency indicators. Over time there are now more outcome-
based indicators looking at effectiveness (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the West of 
Wales). 
 
Even by this point, however, budgetary stewardship remained much more influential than 
performance improvement in Welsh local authorities. Although the requirement for a 
balanced budget held ultimate sway in both countries, the resulting hybrid in England was 
more equally balanced, largely due to the various incentives that the UK Government 
introduced to encourage councils to take greater account of performance issues. Our 
interviewees agreed that this difference was ‘definitely a reflection of differences in ideology 
of the governments’ (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the North of Wales), which 
manifested itself in the methods they adopted to try and change the existing logics within 
local authorities: 
 
I think the differences between England and Wales can be directly attributable to the different 
inspection/regulation regimes and financial arrangements and policy agendas which have 
developed since devolution (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the South of Wales).   
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, both the English and Welsh authorities we studied created a hybrid institutional logic 
that married aspects of budgetary stewardship with ideas of performance improvement. 
Although local authorities in both countries wished to avoid overspending on the budget, 
English councils were also concerned about getting a good score for their performance 
assessment, whereas their Welsh counterparts wanted to reduce the threat of central 
intervention. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Wales was somewhat slower to take 
these steps, primarily because the Welsh Government was more reluctant to influence local 
priority-setting. Advocates of performance improvement were in a much stronger negotiating 
position once the Welsh Government supported this logic with a more direct and hierarchical 
approach and accompanied it with potential sanctions. Table 1 summarizes the process of 
hybridization in both countries. 
 
 England Wales 
Recognition Quicker to recognise implications of 
performance improvement for 
budgetary stewardship. Performance 
interpreted as both ‘efficiency’ and 
‘effectiveness’ 
Slower to recognise implications of 
performance improvement for 
budgetary stewardship. Performance 
interpreted initially as ‘efficiency’ 
rather than ‘effectiveness’ 
Negotiation Largely peaceful compromise 
between advocates of performance 
improvement (in Chief Executive’s 
office and UK Government) and 
budgetary stewardship (in finance 
department). Performance advocates 
quite powerful in negotiations 
Largely peaceful compromise 
between advocates of performance 
improvement (in Chief Executive’s 
office and Welsh Government) and 
budgetary stewardship (in finance 
department). Performance advocates 
less powerful in negotiations 
Operationalization Performance improvement 
embedded and influential in 
hybridized arrangement, although 
‘ultimate fall back is the budget’ 
Performance improvement present, 
but less embedded and influential in 
hybridized arrangement; budgetary 
stewardship dominates 
 
Table 1: Comparing the process of hybridization in English and Welsh local government 
 Moreover, the negotiations that led to its creation proceeded relatively peacefully, because 
advocates of each perspective were willing to agree compromise solutions to further the 
strategic objectives of their council. Drawing on these findings, we hypothesize that other 
organizations with cooperative working cultures may develop hybrids in a similar way, rather 
than on a ‘battlefield’. Indeed, we suggest that a more appropriate metaphor for such contexts 
would be the ‘negotiating table’: a place at which representatives of conflicting institutional 
logics cooperate to agree compromises, rather than compete with each other for dominance.  
 
In addition, we found that the power dynamics between representatives of conflicting logics 
play a key role in shaping the nature of the resulting hybrid. Other contextual factors, such as 
the persuasiveness of particular individuals, political ideology or exogenous pressures will 
also be important. However, we would argue that compromise hybrids are probably the most 
likely outcome of these negotiations: cooperative belief systems mean representatives of each 
conflicting logic are more predisposed to discuss and accept compromises, and therefore 
‘pure’ dominant logics or a deadlock in negotiations between conflicting parties are rare 
occurrences.  
 
In contrast, competitive working environments are more likely to result in the domination of 
one logic over another, because their advocates are not as predisposed to cooperation and 
negotiation. For the same reasons, a battlefield scenario is more likely than a negotiating table 
to result in deadlock – although this might still only occur in a minority of cases. 
Furthermore, although hybrids can still emerge from ‘battlefields’, it could be that such 
competitive environments mean they are less stable than those that are agreed at the 
negotiating table. This is because the advocates of conflicting logics may feel less ownership 
of the resulting hybrid if it developed in a competitive context, and they might also be more 
likely to continue fighting their corner during the operationalization stage. Conversely, 
representatives of conflicting logics may be happier with both the process and the outcome of 
a more cooperative negotiation, and therefore less likely to try and sabotage it. 
 
Working 
culture 
Competitive Cooperative 
Space for 
resolving 
conflict 
Battlefield Negotiating table 
Outcome of 
hybridization 
Domination Compromise Deadlock Domination Compromise Deadlock 
Likelihood Quite likely Quite likely 
Quite 
unlikely 
Unlikely Likely 
Very 
unlikely 
 
Table 2: Hypothesizing the hybridization of conflicting logics in competitive and cooperative 
organizations 
 
Table 2 sets out these hypotheses in greater detail. Such investigations were beyond the scope 
of our study but nonetheless help to frame future research in this field. 
 
Conclusions  
 
This article concurs with previous studies that found organizations can accommodate a range 
of different institutional logics simultaneously, even if they have conflicting objectives that 
may pull decision-makers in different directions. Similarly, it highlighted how new or 
challenging logics need support from powerful actors and/or incentives to be incorporated 
into the new arrangement – and the stronger these drivers are, the more influential these 
logics will become. As such, it supports the findings of many previous studies concerning the 
factors that can lead to organizational change. 
 
In addition, the article makes two further contributions. Firstly, in order to explain how 
hybrids arise and the forms that they can take, it can be useful to disaggregate the process of 
hybridization into three stages: recognition, negotiation and operationalization. This helped 
us to identify the reasons why the Welsh and English hybrids differed from each other. For 
example, it was only after the Welsh Government took a more hierarchical approach towards 
local authorities that performance improvement in this country progressed past the 
recognition stage – and it remains less influential here than in England. This finding suggests 
the need for further comparative study into the relative influence of actors that advocate 
different logics within organizations, as well as how field-level actors (in this case central 
governments) might seek to shape decision-making and implement their objectives at the 
local level. 
 
Our second contribution relates to how representatives of conflicting logics interact with each 
other, particularly during the negotiation phase. In contrast to the prevailing view that they 
are engaged in a ‘battle’ for supremacy, we found that they are willing to compromise at 
metaphorical ‘negotiating tables’, so that the resulting hybrid logic develops in a 
comparatively peaceful manner and comprises a blend of previously conflicting principles. 
Indeed, we found that local authorities in two different countries, which were subjected to 
different external pressures from their respective central governments, both opted to 
hybridize the logic of performance improvement ‘peacefully’ alongside their existing 
preference for budgetary stewardship. Therefore, the metaphor of a negotiating table as a 
space for hybridization can apply in more than just a single case. Indeed, it may be just as 
applicable as the analogy of a battlefield, particularly in contexts where actors are more likely 
to engage in cooperative behaviours. This shows how institutional logics are a subset of the 
organizational culture, and that such belief systems play a key role in shaping the nature of 
conflict during hybridization.  
 
These findings open up new avenues for both practitioners and academics. As far as the 
former are concerned, they may not need to gird themselves for battle with the 
representatives of incumbent institutional logics if they wish to effect change. Instead, it may 
be more productive to create and sit at metaphorical negotiating tables and seek to identify 
areas of compromise that could lead to the development of hybrid arrangements – particularly 
if a cooperative working culture already exists. As we suggest in Table 2, such a strategy may 
actually result in a more stable outcome, because it would ensure that advocates of 
conflicting logics feel included in the process of developing the hybrid.  
 
For their part, scholars might wish to examine how the hybrids within English and Welsh 
local authorities may have evolved since we undertook our fieldwork. We carried out our 
interviews between 2010 and 2012, and councils have experienced significant changes since 
then. Major funding cuts have increased the pressure to focus on budgetary stewardship and 
hold down input costs within local government, and the abolition of centralized frameworks 
may have reduced the influence of performance improvement advocates in England. Some 
aspects of this logic remain within individual councils, including key performance indicators, 
performance reporting and benchmarking. However, many authorities have responded to 
austerity pressures by slimming down Chief Executives’ departments, thereby reducing the 
support infrastructure for performance improvement ideas within these organizations. 
Although our interviewees did expect the focus on centralized performance frameworks to 
wane, they may have underestimated the extent to which this would occur. Indeed, recent 
developments might have resulted in such profound changes to the power dynamics involving 
advocates of the conflicting logics that the hybrid could be vulnerable to challenge. With this 
in mind, an in-depth repeat study could reveal some fascinating insights into the longevity of 
this particular hybrid, and how it responded to external and internal pressures. 
 
More generally, future research could apply our three-stage process model to future studies of 
hybridization, or examine whether the metaphor of a negotiating table is more relevant than 
that of a battlefield in other organizations that are characterized by cooperation. 
Organizations that are themselves some kind of public-private hybrid might represent 
particularly interesting cases for analysing whether advocates of conflicting logics compete 
with each other or prefer to cooperate. Such studies might also investigate how contrasting 
attitudes towards negotiation affect the resulting hybrid. For example, if private actors are 
less amenable to compromise than public organizations, then the outcome may be more 
closely aligned with their interests. As such, they could draw on the hypotheses we set out in 
Table 2 to examine how contrasting workplace cultures may influence hybridization and its 
outcome. Such research could cast new light on how socio-organizational structures shape the 
nature of change, and the extent to which individual actors can exercise agency in different 
contexts. Studies of this nature would raise questions of accountability and legitimacy within 
public-private hybrids, as well as provide useful contributions to the existing literature on 
public management and administration, institutional logics and hybridization. 
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